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Public-Private  Partnerships  (PPPs)  realize  three  critical  strategic  issues  for  improving  the 
quality  of  urban  services:  the  enhancement  of  governmental  financing  capabilities,  the 
improvement  of  public  investment  efficiency,  and  the  harnessing  of  consumer-orientated 
management expertise. Based on a sample of 20 projects embarked upon by the city of 
Warsaw, we examine the process of project selection and planning and the prerequisites for 
satisfactory  completion.  The  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  on  the  PPP  pre-
implementation  process  and  offers  a  perspective  on  the  potential  of  PPPs  in  emerging 
economies.  Key  policy  recommendations  are  (1)  central  headquarters  for  coordination  of 
planning  processes,  (2)  clear  project  selection  criteria,  (3)  involvement  of  independent 
consulting companies to legitimate the process to subsequent administrations, (4) ex ante risk 
allocation and ex post performance measurement procedures, (5) pre-determined termination 
conditions, (6) commitment to starting the process and learning by doing; and (7) knowledge 
transfer and retention mechanisms. 
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Public-Private  Partnerships  (PPPs),  long-term  cooperation  agreements  between  a  public 
authority and the private sector to provide public services, have become a popular approach 
to  infrastructure  development.  Since  the  mid-1980s,  the  notion  of  partnership  in  urban 
renewal and development has attracted considerable discourse in Western countries,
1 but the 
discussions on public management have tended to be polarized and both advocates and 
opponents of private sector involvement in the provision of public services have emerged 
(Grimshaw et al., 2001; Ghere, 2001). Despite the controversies over PPP, the United Nations 
and the European Commission have promoted and fostered it as an instrument for urban 
development,
2  especially  in  countries  whose  public  budgets  cannot  support  substantial 
expenditures  (see,  for  example,  Chang  et  al.,  2003).  Using  a  flagship  PPP  program 
undertaken  by  the  city  of  Warsaw,  this  case-based  paper  offers  a  pragmatic  view  of  the 
critical  stages  of  PPP  planning  and  adds  to  the  literature  about  PPPs’  prerequisites  for 
success. 
Public  projects  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (CEE)  have  traditionally  been  financed  with 
public money and have produced poor infrastructure, which has led to unsatisfactory quality 
of public services. Public pressure motivates administrations to look for alternative methods of 
procuring  and  operating  infrastructure-related  projects,  and  urban  projects  make  up  a 
significant percentage of these projects.  
There are three critical strategic issues related to improving urban infrastructure in emerging 
economies:  1)  the  enhancement  of  governmental  financing  capabilities  through  the 
mobilization of private-sector funds, 2) the improvement of public investment efficiency, and 3) 
the harnessing of consumer-orientated management. PPPs are emerging as one of the most 
viable  and  efficient  methods  for  addressing  these  issues.  Local  governments  in  emerging 
economies in CEE have been slow to make the transition from traditional methods of public 
service  delivery  to  internationally  proven  alternative  approaches  largely  because  of  the 
considerable mistrust and confusion that persists about the nature of PPPs and the limited 
experience  in  this  field.  The  extent  to  which  PPPs  are  used  in  Poland  is  very  small  in 
comparison  to  developed  countries,  with  projects  working  in  only  three  out  of  the  eleven 
                                                 
1 A landmark book was published by Brooks et al. (1984). 
2  Two  examples  are  the  Public-Private  Partnerships  for  Urban  Development,  a  United  Nations  Development 
Programme  initiative  to  alleviate  poverty  through  public-private  partnerships  in  poor  cities  throughout  the 
developing world (see http://pppue.undp.org), and the European Commission’s manual, “Guidelines for Successful 
Public-Private Partnership.”  
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sectors listed by the European Investment Bank (European Investment Bank, 2004; Bondal, 
2005).  
Considerable  literature  has  been  devoted  to  the  efficiency  of  PPPs  (see,  for  example, 
Vaillancourt-Rosenau,  2000;  Moszoro,  2010)  and  particular  case  studies.
3  However,  the 
literature on the pre-implementation process of dealing with PPPs, which is fundamental to 
the success of the whole process, is modest, although a notable exception is Grimsey and 
Lewis (2004). We trace the processes upon which the city of Warsaw has embarked in order 
to determine how to engage the private sector in PPPs for the benefit of society. The article 
reviews the background of twenty flagship projects, describes the processes undertaken to 
select  and  plan  them,  and  draws  conclusions  concerning  prerequisites  for  satisfactory 
completion.  The  article  also  presents  the  strengths  of  PPPs  in  terms  of  bringing  together 
multiple  stakeholders  and  distributing  risk  among  them,  the  benefits  of  engaging  external 
advisers,  and  the  necessity  of  establishing  quality  performance  measurements  and 
termination conditions in the contract. In so doing, it offers an important perspective on the 
potential of PPPs in emerging economies as an effective mechanism with which to develop 
infrastructure and improve the quality of public services. Given that Warsaw is the largest city 
in  CEE  and  perhaps  one  of  the  most  complex,  the  conclusions  drawn  from  its  ongoing 
process of urban PPP implementation will be profoundly important for similar efforts being 
made by beginners in this field. 
1. Analytical Model of Public-Private Relationships 
National,  regional,  and  municipal  governments  must  be  aware  of  the  expectations  of  the 
society  they  serve.  Public  projects  (for  example,  public  utilities,  roads,  and  schools)  must 
deliver a service at a certain expected level of quality, but if they involve private investors, they 
must also meet the expected financial payback from the invested capital. 
Public agents can control the service provider directly through a having stake in the project 
(usually a Special Purpose Vehicle, or SPV) or indirectly through regulation (price caps and 
quality  controls).  In  the  last  decade,  emphasis  has  shifted  from  the  former  to  the  latter 
(Newbery, 2000). However, governments must safeguard themselves against the risk of being 
“captured”  by  private  investors  (Viscusi,  Vernon  and  Harrington,  2000),
4  so  governments 
should set ex ante clear and unambiguous objectives in order to prevent public projects from 
being dominated by the for-profit corporate governance of the private partner (Heinz 2005). 
The  best  tool  with  which  to  protect  the  interest  of  the  government  and  the  final  users  it 
represents is a properly negotiated contract, that is, a contract that spells out and minimizes 
risks for both parties.  
According to the European System of Accounts, PPP risks can be classified into three broad 
categories: construction risk, availability risk, and demand risk (Bondal, 2005). Construction 
risk covers events such as late delivery, costs overages, and technical deficiency. Availability 
risk refers to the private contractor’s failure to deliver the agreed volume and/or quality or her 
failure to meet specified safety or public certification standards. Demand risk refers to the 
                                                 
3 Two rich databases of PPP projects can be found at:  
-  Partnerships UK, http://www.partnershipsuk.org.uk/projectsDatabase/projects-database.asp 
-  World Bank's Private Participation in Infrastructure Project Database, http://ppi.worldbank.org 
4 Regulatory capture is a phenomenon in which a government regulatory agency which is supposed to be acting in 
the public interest becomes dominated by the vested interests of the existing incumbents in the industry that it 
oversees.   
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variability in demand that is outside the control of the private partner, such as variations in the 
business cycle, new market trends, direct competition, or technological obsolescence. It is 
important  that,  when  planning  a  PPP,  public  managers  stipulate  the  mechanisms  of  risk 
allocation and quality regulation in the contract. 
Figure  1  presents  an  analytical  model  of  the  relationships  between  the  partners  and 
stakeholders in a PPP. 
 
Figure 1 
Analytical Model of Public-Private Relationships  
 
 
In a PPP there concur capital and business transfers, contractual and legal relationships, and 
informal  ties  and  influences  between  public  and  private  agents,  involving  diverse  research 
fields, for which there is a rich literature.
5 The present paper focuses on PPP agreements and 
PPP regulation design in local governments. 
                                                 
5 On public choice refer to Buchanan and Tullock (1962); on regulation, lobbying, and capture: Stigler (1971), Hard, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington (2000); on cost-benefit analysis and financial feasibility 
analysis: Zerbe and Dively (1994); on institutional economics and corporate governance: Williamson (1985). We 
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Note: double lines represent capital and business transfers, solid single lines represent contractual and legal 
relationships, and dashed lines represent informal ties and influences.  
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2. Selection of Projects 
Once the administration recognizes and agrees on the benefits of PPP (for a list of the benefits 
of using PPP in urban development, see McQuaid, 1999), planning and implementation can 
begin.  
In the case of Warsaw, there were three primary criteria for project selection, consistent with 
the  normative  public  sector's  goals  of  effectiveness,  efficiency,  and  equity  (Forrer  et  al., 
2010:475): 
•  Need:  projects  must  serve  and  fulfill  a  real  gap  in  the  service  to  the  local 
community. 
•  Challenge:  projects  must  serve  as  benchmarks  for  future  projects  in  the  same 
sector. 
•  Attainability: projects must have a high probability of success. 
Over the past 20 years, economic and social realities have changed radically in Poland,
6 and 
the need to increase the quality of public services has risen dramatically. After years in which 
public infrastructure was deteriorating or growing only slowly, a new challenge emerged for 
local governments: today, people rightly expect public services to be tailored to their needs, 
delivered  efficiently,  and  developed  to  the  highest  standard.  Investment  needs  in  Warsaw 
have also been influenced by planned international events that can be a source of tourism and 
that demand the development of primary and ancillary facilities.
7  
The ideal PPP project provides services in the public domain—that is, services the provision of 
which  is  a  responsibility  of  the  government—and  is  marketable  (for  example,  water,  city 
transport, and sports facilities). Marketable services that are not in the public domain should 
not be candidates for a PPP since they constitute an area for regular business activity, nor 
should  services  in  the  public  domain  that  are  not  marketable  or  that  should  not  be 
marketable, such as defense and public administration. 
                                                 
6 Poland has being seen as an attractive place to invest. According to the European Cities Monitor 2006 report 
prepared by Cushman and Wakefield (European Cities Monitor 2006), Warsaw was ranked #18 among the most 
attractive European cities for business, and as many as 50 of the largest 500 European companies wanted to 
invest in Warsaw. Moreover, it was the only European economy to sustain positive economic growth during the 
2007-2009 world crisis. 
7 Warsaw celebrated the 200th birth of Fryderyk Chopin in 2010 and hosted the XVI International Fryderyk Chopin 
Piano Competition. Also, it is one of the host cities of the soccer Euro Cup 2012.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 5 
Figure 2 
Mapping PPP within a public domain x marketability matrix 
 
 
In recent years, PPP models have evolved toward public domain services, which are less 
subject to marketability (for example, city roads and public schools). These models include the 
application  of  shadow  tolls,  availability  payments,  and  infrastructure  lease-backs—
mechanisms in which financial payments to the private partner come from the government, 
not from the market. 
3. Projects Undertaken by the City of Warsaw  
Taking into account the criteria of need, challenge, and attainability, city officials selected five 
sectors—environmental protection, transport, health care, education and science, and sports 
and  recreation
8—and  short-listed  20  projects  for  further  discussion:  two  waste  utilization 
plants, seven parking lots, a city car line to suburban Piaseczno, a new traffic fine registration 
and collection system, a hospital, a technology park, and seven sports and recreation facilities 
(see table 1).
9 Out of these, 16 were greenfield and four were redevelopment projects, and all 
demanded substantial capital investments.  
                                                 
8 The tender on PPP advisory services for the city of Warsaw was published in the Official Public Bulletin (see: 
http://ogloszeniabzp.um.warszawa.pl/zamowienie.php?zamowienie=18348). 
9 Rather than a closed list, these projects are indicative of the discussions held by the city of Warsaw and are 
presented to reflect the practical exercise the city of Warsaw went through in 2007-2009. Final analyses, to be 
carried  out  by  the  consulting  companies,  may  lead  to  a  different  list  of  priorities,  projects,  and  means  of 
implementation. 
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Table 1 
PPP flagship projects in the city of Warsaw 





−  ZUSOK: waste utilization plant  Redevelopment 
−  ZUSOK II: thermal waste utilization plant  Greenfield 
Transport  −  6 underground parking lots (Defilad, Teatralny, 
Sienkiewicza, Emilii Plater, Spiska, Wawelska) 
Greenfield 
−  Multi-story parking lot (Targowek district)  Greenfield 
−  City car line to suburban Piaseczno  Greenfield 
−  Traffic fine registration and collection system  Greenfield 
Very large 
buildings 
−  Hospital  Greenfield 
−  Technology park  Greenfield 
Sports & 
recreation facilities 
−  Hutnik Club field and ancillary facilities (Bielany district)  Redevelopment/ 
−  Miedzeszyn sports facilities (Wawer district)  Greenfield 
−  Indoor swimming pool (Wlochy district)   Greenfield 
−  Arena Varsovia hall (Targowek district)   Greenfield 
−  Ursus Club sports and hotel facilities (Ursus district)   Greenfield 
−  Wisla Recreational Center (Gorczewska)   Redevelopment 
−  Polonia Club facilities   Redevelopment 
Source: City of Warsaw press release no. 18086 of February 11, 2009. 
 
To provide an overall view of the projects, the basic rationales and examples of risk allocation 
between the public and private partners of several projects are presented next.
10 
Arena Varsovia was treated as a priority investment because Warsaw lacked the infrastructure 
it needed in order to organize large, prestigious sports, business, and cultural indoor events. 
In order to meet this need, city officials specified that the Arena Varsovia Center must hold 
approximately  12,000  people.  The  design  and  building  risks  lie  entirely  with  the  private 
partner, as does the later management of the facility. 
The sports facility was also chosen because of public need in particular districts. The plan is 
for these sports facilities to be financed and operated by private investors and for the city to 
be able to purchase bulk hours at a discount for public schools.  
The parking lots will be located under main squares and traffic-congested areas. According to 
feasibility  studies,  these  investments  can  be  completely  financed  and  operated  by  private 
investors. However, in the case of underground parking lots, according to local law, the real 
estate beneath the squares cannot be unbundled and sold since the city is the owner of the 
squares. Therefore, the operator will work on a concession or long-term lease. 
                                                 
10 Performance measures, although specified in detail in the PPP projects and of fundamental meaning for the 
quality of public services, have been omitted from this paper due to the extensive length of the lists - in some 
cases, more than a hundred pages.  
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Warsaw’s  largely  residential  Ursynow  district,  with  300,000  inhabitants,  did  not  have  a 
hospital. Under the PPP formula, the hospital will be financed and operated by the private 
investor. Some of the services will be contracted by the National Health Fund (NFZ), so users 
who are insured by NFZ will be provided service at the same quality level as those who use 
the hospital on a fully paid basis. 
4. Ex Ante Constraints 
Forrer  et  al.  (2010:479-482)  present  a  six-dimension  model  to  assist  public  managers  in 
improving PPPs' public accountability based on risk, costs and benefits, political and social 
impacts,  expertise,  collaboration,  and  performance  measurement.  In  line  with  this 
accountability model, city managers established three ex-ante requirements for PPP projects 
to be taken into account in the planning and tailoring process: 
•  private management involvement (not only capital), 
•  public control of service quality through Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), 
•  modeling as a non-generating public debt PPP 
 
4.1. Private Management Involvement 
Since it is the wealthiest city in the region, Warsaw can undertake almost all needed public 
investment  on  its  own  through  debt  markets,  without  the  involvement  of  private  equity 
financing. With annual revenues of PLN 7.7 billion (EUR 2.1 billion) in 2006,
11 Warsaw could 
bear debt of PLN 4.6 billion (EUR 1.2 billion).
12 Warsaw’s public debt in 2006 was PLN 2.6 
billion,
13 so there is still room for an additional PLN 2 billion (EUR 540 million) in debt. 
However, the city authorities realized the fundamental role of private management involvement 
as a cost minimization factor and a source of service quality. Moreover, private funds release 
public funds to be used for other priorities, while enhancing the city’s credit ratings. 
 
4.2. Public Control of Performance and Quality of Service 
The city of Warsaw committed to exercising control of quality of the services delivered by the 
private  partners  through  KPIs,  measures  specifically  tailored  for  each  sector  and  for  both 
primary and secondary services. KPIs establish a benchmark for providers and communicate 
to users that the service, although privately provided, remains a public responsibility and in the 
public domain. KPIs are central to the positive social perception of a PPP, so they should be 
published, if possible, to ensure the accountability of third parties. KPIs must be established in 
the contract, as must the measurement methodology, acceptance standards, frequency of 
controls, and consequences if standards are not met. 
                                                 
11 Resolution No. LXIV/1947/2005 of the Council of the city of Warsaw on the budget of the City for the year 2006. 
12 At the time of writing the paper, the maximum debt allowed for local governments in Poland by the Public 
Finance Law was 60 percent of planned annual revenues. 
13 Quarterly report Rb-K on the debt of local governments for 2006.  
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4.3. Modeling as a Non-Generating Public Debt PPP 
Eurostat's
14 ESA95 standards (cf. STAT/04/18 of February 11, 2004) specify the accounting 
treatment  in  the  national  accounts  of  contracts  undertaken  by  government  units  in  the 
framework of partnerships with non-government units, and their impact on government deficit 
and debt. According to these standards, the assets involved in a public-private partnership 
should be classified as non-government assets and recorded off-balance for the government 
unit, if they meet two conditions:   
•  the private partner bears the construction risk 
•  the  private  partner  bears  either  the  availability  or  demand  risk  or  both  (European 
Commission, 2004). 
Therefore, out of the eight possible combinations of construction, availability, and demand 
risks, only three can be recorded off balance sheet and accounted as a non-generating public 
debt PPP (see table 2). 
 
Table 2 
Non-generating Public Debt PPP (according to Eurostat and Polish Law) 
Risk 
0 = publicly held, not transferred 
1 = transferred to the private partner 
Off-balance sheet PPP  In-balance sheet PPP or no PPP 
Construction  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
Availability  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  0 
Demand  1  1  0  0  0  1  1  0 
 
A risk is considered to be transferred when the private investor assumes the major share of 
the consequences attached to a risk category. 
5. Stages in PPP Contracting and Regulation 
The starting point for any successful PPP is the public authorities’ reaching consensus on its 
goals.  If  complete  agreement  on  the  benefits  of  a  PPP  is  lacking,  the  public  mandate  to 
prepare  and  execute  the  contracts  will  not  be  strong,  and  the  private  partner  can  take 
advantage of this during negotiations. In Warsaw, the mandate was explicit and a deputy 
mayor was responsible for the whole process, which was executed through the Investors’ 
Service Office, a newly created unit. 
After  selecting  the  projects  and  performing  the  preliminary  feasibility  study,  the  Investors’ 
Service Office decided to put out a tender for advisory services from consortia of financial, 
legal, and engineering firms, the winners of which would be responsible for advising the city 
                                                 
14 Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union.  
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on the process for undertaking certain projects
15 Although involving external consultants was 
not legally compulsory, there were two reasons for doing so: the lack of expertise in PPP 
modeling in the city of Warsaw added value to the contribution of international consulting 
companies that could bring expertise from other countries where PPP solutions work, and the 
engagement of independent consultants would strengthen the objectivity of the process to 
safeguard  city  authorities  against  complaints,  criticism  and  challenges  by  subsequent 
administrations. The latter concern is especially important in countries in which the rule of law 
is weak and probity is not obvious and where third parties may protest that the process of 
consultation and cooperation between the public and private sectors has crossed over to 
collusion.
16 The purpose of offering the tender for consulting services from consortia, rather 
than individually with financial, legal, and engineering consulting firms, was to facilitate the 
focus of city managers’ communications to one point and to encourage concise proposals 
from consultants. 
The choice of advisory consortia was made in a two-stage public tender. In the first stage, 
four  consortia,  led  by  renowned  companies,  were  selected  based  on  their  experience, 
credentials,  and  the  curricula  of  key  experts.
17  In  the  second  stage,  city  managers  will 
negotiate terms and conditions directly with the four short-listed consortia.  
When a project is awarded to an advisory consortium, the city managers and the advisory 
consortium  will  prepare  the  business  model  for  the  project,  the  KPIs,  and  the  tender 
documentation for private investors. Next, the advisory consortium will support the city during 
contract negotiations with private investors, and the contracts will be signed.  
During  the  preparation  of  business  models  and  negotiations  with  the  private  partner,  risk 
allocation  between  the  parties  will  have  to  meet  the  established  criteria  so  that  payment 
obligations on the city can be considered off-balance sheet. Governments have a variety of 
instruments that can help them mitigate the risks transferred to the private partner, such as 
the transfer of land for a certain period, bulk purchases of services, and limitation of direct 
competition in a certain area. For example, in the case of the Arena Varsovia, the city will 
participate in the investment by providing the land and by guaranteeing a minimum demand. 
A similar mechanism of risk mitigation will be used in sports and recreation facilities, from 
which the city will buy bulk hours for schools. In the case of parking lots, in order to limit the 
demand risk transferred to the private investor, the city authorities will commit to rigorous 
execution of the restrictions on parking zones in the city streets. 
The  last  open-ended  task  remaining  for  the  government  will  be  the  monitoring  and 
performance evaluation of the private partner. If the terms of the contract are not fulfilled, the 
city  should  have  the  option  of  imposing  fees  or  even  terminating  the  contract  (although 
sometimes terminating the contract is difficult to achieve; see Ball and King, 2006). 
 
                                                 
15 See the Official Public Bulletin: 
http://ogloszeniabzp.um.warszawa.pl/zamowienie.php?zamowienie=18348 for details on the tender on PPP 
advisory services for the city of Warsaw. One of the authors (Moszoro) was involved in the design of this two-stage 
tender mechanism. 
16 Leitch and Motion (2003) describe a recent example of public-private collusion. 
17  Selected  consortia  were  to  be  led  by  Deloitte  Advisory,  Depfa  Bank,  Ernst  &Young,  and  PriceWaterhouse 
Coopers (cf. City of Warsaw press release no. 18086 of February 11, 2009).  
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6. Policy Recommendations 
Seven specific policy recommendations can be drawn from the implementation process of 
PPP by the city of Warsaw.  
First, until tenders are released and the regular performance evaluation can be passed on to 
individual departments, it is important to have a central headquarters for the coordination of 
the PPP planning process between the city departments and private investors. In Warsaw, 
this role was fulfilled by the Investors’ Service Office. 
Second, the administration should clearly define its selection criteria and constraints for the 
projects. 
Third, in young democracies and emerging economies, independent advisory companies play 
an important role in bringing in expertise in PPPs and help to strengthen the legitimacy of the 
process for subsequent administrations. 
Fourth, financial models are secondary to risk allocation and performance measurement. Our 
experience  is  that  many  local  governments  focus  too  much  on  the  financing  side  and 
underestimate  the  importance  of  ex  ante  risk  allocation  and  the  ex  post  performance 
measurement procedures connected to payments. 
Fifth, even when a partnership is expected to last for a long period, partnership termination 
conditions must be predetermined in such a way as to discourage the partners from engaging 
in opportunistic behavior at the expense of the other party. 
Sixth, theoretical advice cannot replace practice. Since each urban area is unique in its own 
way,  there  is  no  ideal  pattern  to  follow.  Warsaw  chose  several  projects  that  can  be 
transformed into success stories, but they are also projects from which officials can learn by 
doing.  
Seventh, and finally, mechanisms should be in place to retain the benefit of the knowledge 
acquired during the implementation of the projects. Accordingly, the city of Warsaw required 
the advisory companies to provide training sessions for the city employees responsible for the 
PPP process and execution. 
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